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Introduction
The frictional seams in military-civilian cooperation are the frequent subject of discussion, typically highlighting issues such as disconnects between the regional authority of combatant commanders and the bilateral approach of individual country ambassadors, or between diplomatic and military regional theater boundaries. Proposed solutions to redress these perceived shortcomings often recommend new bureaucratic entities to better bind these seams, but such fixes may tempt the further complication rather than resolution of already complex interagency relationships as policy makers attempt to balance diplomatic, economic, military, and informational elements of national power to reach U.S. national goals.
Is there an inherent structural problem with existing U.S. policy-making and implementing mechanisms? Not necessarily, but combatant commanders must remain actively aware of the advantages to be derived from natural coordinating mechanisms within current structures to achieve optimal results.
This paper seeks to demonstrate, by means of a case study of U.S. security cooperation with Suriname, that existing policy coordination mechanisms are fully adequate to meet policy challenges in the inherently multiagency activities of non-crisis interventions in the areas of law enforcement including anti-narcotics and arms trafficking efforts and related issues of civil-military relations in the context of regional stabilization. It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate effectiveness with regard to crisis and wartime interventions, but one may hope that even if current successes are indeed limited to the narrow focus area addressed here, those habits might eventually transfer to other cooperation spheres as well.
An appropriate and effective integration of interagency assets is especially important in relation to national security goals in a Latin American context. The nexus among narcotics finance, arms smuggling, and the funding of international terrorism is a frightening reality that finds ready possible expression in this region. With U.S. ability to combat drug and arms trafficking therefore an important element in preserving U.S. national security, understanding institutional arrangements with an eye to ensuring their most effective use is a worthy topic for reflection and application to similar challenges in other theaters.
The Perceived Operational Challenge
What is the fundamental problem as Combatant Commands interact with the civilian agency world? Jennifer Taw, in a study on interagency issues for the Army in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) crisis response outlines the commonly perceived dilemma in familiar form when she argues 1 that the Combatant Commands hold a unique position in the interagency process, insofar as they do not have direct agency counterparts who hold comparable rank in the civilian world. She continues that:
"there are, of course, regionally oriented assistant secretaries, but they are neither deployed nor responsible as the CINCs (sic) are for operations on the ground. Conversely, there are ambassadors, who are both deployed and responsible for field-level operations, but they are responsible for individual countries rather than regions. Command on a regular and institutionalized basis to help achieve unity of military and civilian effort and ensure adequate input into combatant commanders' regional planning.
4
While the temptation to overcome difficulties with new bureaucratic entities is a strong one, and can certainly be cogently argued by advancing the need to make contrasting structures more superficially similar as they are tasked to coordinate activities, an examination of interagency law enforcement/regional stabilization activities in Suriname provides fodder to challenge assertions that new structures are in fact necessary. Moreover, existing structures may be especially appropriate for the types of non-crisis activities being examined, resting as they inevitably must not only on interagency resources, but on multilateral partners.
To capture that conclusion, this paper proceeds along the following method.
First, a background section outlines the characteristics and essential challenges for U.S. Numerous financial regulatory mechanisms including the establishment of a Financial
Intelligence Unit have been implemented in the last two years, but "Suriname's overall anti-money laundering regime remains weak." 10 Laundering is believed to occur through several means including the manipulation of commercial and state controlled bank accounts.
Trafficking in persons both to and through Suriname remains a concern, although the government has established an anti-trafficking commission and its Public
Prosecutor's Office has worked with police to assist possible trafficking victims. 
Significance for U.S. Interests
Despite significant challenges, the GOS continues the difficult process of "consolidating democratic, constitutional rule" in the country. 12 As the previous background discussion makes clear, the GOS begins from a fragile basis. The rationale for assisting Suriname to successfully transform to an effective partner is evident. These linkages between these various instruments are an acknowledged asset in performance goals, resting on the assertions that a strengthened democratic civil society with a professional military subordinate to civilian control will contribute to internal, regional, and hemispheric stability, and that a buttressed rule of law will contribute to better law enforcement and thus the fight against illegal drugs, migrant trafficking, and domestic and transnational organized crime. 32 See, for example, Taw, This linking bilateral and regional programming is further reinforced by the COCOM's Political Advisor (POLAD), another coordinating link between these planning levels, and in touch not only with State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs which sponsors the POLAD positions, but typically also with ambassadors and regional bureau personnel. Country team reach back to regional State planning is not intended to minimize the important coordinating role played by POLADs, but rather to demonstrate that incountry entities who bring unique and valuable perspectives have a similar conceptual role. 34 It would indeed be naïve to argue that the ambassador's role as the President's personal representative bestows absolute power to control other agencies' activities, but the strong moral suasion associated with that status is undeniably a valuable tool in orchestrating interagency cooperation in-country.
Managing a Strategy of Partnerships
Beyond these technical and practical bases for arguing the country team "personification" of A/S-COCOM planning equivalency, there is another compelling benefit to exploiting the coordinating functionality of the country team when implementing intervention areas discussed in this paper. By their nature, law enforcement, counter-narcotics, and anti-terrorism issues inherently lend themselves to technical, multidisciplinary, and international approaches; that is, they often require integration of third-country participation.
As Secretary of State Colin Powell has stressed, 35 world opinion's attention to perceived U.S. bilateralism in the Middle East obscures the prominent intention of the current National Security Strategy to work through international partnerships in meeting common security challenges. In Suriname, this means cooperation with the Dutch, but also British, governments in the areas of law enforcement and civil-military relations.
Note that in the Suriname case, as will be true in many others, the geographic pattern or intra-donor participation will not necessarily fall within a single geographic region, as delineated either by State or the Combatant Commands.
How does the United States coordinate with those partners? Some recent
examples from Suriname 36 demonstrate the utility of tapping the routine in-country donor coordination that naturally occurs among embassies for the decision-making process.
When it was proposed three years ago that the Milgroup in Suriname be considered for closure, a major factor in the decision to retain the office was apparently input from 
Conclusions and Recommendations
Sometimes, structures aren't broken. As military and civilian planners contemplate how best to mesh their tools in the deliberate non-crisis planning environment that supports law enforcement/counter-narcotics issues, the Combatant Commanders starts from a solid basis in paying explicit concern to linkages with country teams and ambassadors. Keeping in mind the reasons underpinning that wisdom, as reflected in the following axiom and three corollaries, will ensure that these advantages are exploited to maximum advantage.
• Equivalent Regional Planning Entities .
